What a difference a year makes. As 2003 began, Wall Street
was hung with crepe. Three savagely down years in a row had taken an
enormous toll, on portfolios and on confidence. Expectations for the coming
year were muted, if not downright bleak. So of course, Mr. Market threw one
heck of a party, and made sure the festivities were led by some of the
rankest speculative holdovers from the late, great bull.
So now what? Wall Street research publications, business magazines and
newspapers of late have been bursting forth (tis the season) with
predictions for the nascent year. Virtually all of them following the hoary
journalistic tradition of mindlessly extrapolating the present into the
future. Happy days are here, and forever, again.
Did that sound too harsh? It wasn’t meant to be. For the amateur and
professional prognosticators alike are merely doing what they know how to do
best: projecting conventional wisdom. And, as measured by a variety of
sentiment gauges, investor sentiment has rarely been this bullish. Nor has
it—ever—stayed this buoyant for anywhere near this long.
Indeed, if I hadn’t learned, the hard way, in the late 1990s, that Lord
Keynes was entirely correct to suggest that markets can stay irrational far
longer than investors can stay solvent, I might be tempted to do something
foolish, like call a top. Instead, I called Justin Mamis, over the holiday.
My mission: to find out what clues his gimlet eye for technical trends and
his vast experience in the market were providing him. What I found was a
portrait of the analyst as a frustrated man.
The “good” news, Justin relays, is his wife’s observation that his is the
rare sort of frustration that has always, in the past, heralded truly
significant changes in market trends. The bad news is not only that the
change will likely be in a significantly negative direction, but that
nothing he watches is giving Justin a clue on timing.
KMW
Justin, did I catch you muttering about a “flawed market,” as everybody was
preparing to welcome the New Year?
You and my wife. The thing is, all the indicators everyone has relied on for
years to try to get a handle on what the market will look like in the future
have become unreliable. All the familiar indicators are ineffective. And
yes, I realize that to call the market flawed here reveals an “old” man’s
prejudices—make that his preference for what he’s used to. Then again, what
has changed about the NYSE Specialist System since I once roamed the floor
is, indeed, flawed. And it does seem that a Pandora’s box has been opened by
the bursting of the bubble: Enron, Tyco, Parmalat and all the rest; the
mutual fund malfeasances, the one-way Street kind of breadth days, penny
spreads, the dominance of program trading and ETFs [exchange-traded funds], public disinterest (except from hardcore speculators), etc.,
etc. Then too, you see, I’m firmly convinced that all of the debris from the
stock market bubble hasn’t been washed away.
Happy New Year to you, too!
Not much chance. I think the situation is a variation on the cliché about
“If it ain’t broke….” In this case, it’s, “What has broke, can’t be
fixed”—at least until the impact of the bubble’s bursting has run its course
and we can start over. But that describes a market bottom, not a top.
I detect no little frustration in your voice—
The frustration, for me, is that I have lost almost every meaningful
indicator that I used to follow the market for years— because of changes in
the nature of the business. People—and institutions—simply are not trading
or investing the way they used to. It’s part and parcel of how dramatically
the business has changed, of the ways so many hedge funds and trading desks
work these days. I know someone who used to be a very active trader—and
technician—in Boston. But his desk has no time—or use—for technical studies
anymore. His traders don’t day trade, they “moment-to-moment trade.” He’s
invited me up there to watch, but I really don’t want to see it. I wouldn’t
understand what they are doing anyhow—and it would annoy me terribly when I
saw it.
You wouldn’t understand?
Actually, I do. They make a trade here and a trade there, buying 5,000 of
this or 50,000 of that—and then they sell it before you know it. That can
generate a very profitable day, when they’re trading for 13 cents and don’t
take any real risk. So they do it all the time. They buy virtually any stock
that is down 5, figuring, simply, that it is sure to bounce—then they sell.
That is all they do. They are not doing anything more than just scalping,
really. Trading in pennies has made it all so easy, because there’s almost
no cost anymore to the way most of them do business. In the old days, even a
floor trader had to figure on making at least a quarter-point on a trade to
come out ahead. Now the institutions, the hedge funds, all trade for 2 or 3
cents a share. If they make 13 cents on a trade, their profit is a dime, and
if they’ve bought 50,000 shares, and if they can do that even 6-7 times a
day, without breaking a sweat—
Those pennies add up.
Absolutely. There is also a lot of ETF and program trading going on. Now, I
haven’t worked out yet exactly how either of those two affect the
market—except that there are many more transactions than there used to be
that are merely arbitrage; many more trades that are merely
minute-to-minute; and a lot fewer that represent any commitment to any sort
of long-term investment thesis. All this is supposedly wonderful; the
computers let everybody do five different things at once and hedge every
which way. But the ETFs have to be dangerous long-term.
Why do you say that?
Because if—when—the market turns down again, they will have to accelerate
the selling—if someone is dumping ETF shares, someone else is going to be
dumping the baskets of stocks those ETFs represent. That just has to
accelerate a decline
A la program insurance?
Yes, that is the underlying problem with all derivatives. It’s also part of
what happens now, when the averages spike up so frequently. I know hedge
fund people—and you must, too—who do nothing anymore but trade ETFs. They
can’t be bothered trying to figure out which stock in a group is the right
one to buy. Being able to buy the entire group—or the market in a single
transaction—is a real advantage for them. Old timers like you and I are
outmoded. We have been left behind, in the sense that very few people think
about individual stocks these days. There are any number of my clients today
who simply want to know market direction and, to a lesser extent, timing. I
bet I get fewer than half of the questions that I used to get about
individual stocks—from a client base that includes the mainstream
institutions and hedge funds. Not the lunatic fringe.
Why?
Part of it, I think, has to do with pressures on their time. Talk to just
about any portfolio manager and what you hear is, “I don’t have time to do
any research. The research calls that I get are no good. I don’t want to
listen to those kinds of analysts anymore. My in-house analysts are no good,
either. And I have to spend three-quarters of my time either answering
emails, listening to conference calls or going out and talking to
prospective clients. I don’t have any time to do anything!” In other words,
they don’t have time to do what made them successful. Why not, then, just
come in and say, “Okay, they are going to take technology back up because it
has been down for five days in a row, so I am buying?”
Then just buy a package or an ETF?
Sure. If they get a quick three points out of it, they’re happy. Even the
guys who were long-term in the old days—and didn’t want to talk to me
because I was too “short-term” are now trading like that.
I know, all the program trading, derivatives and ETFs—if you listen to the
hype—“enhance liquidity.” But I suspect what they’re actually enhancing is
the illusion of liquidity—not to mention commissions and banking revenues—in
certain quarters of the Street. I suspect, too, that the wide-spread
dispersion of risk they entail could have a nasty side effect: turning
specific market risk into systemic risk. Someone, somewhere, is still
holding the underlying securities—and just might decide to sell. At which
point, he, she or it may not be too pleased, if prices sink like stones
before a buyer emerges. Pardon my soap box, but what’s the point of all the
financial rocket science if we let it undermine the market’s—and
investors’—ability to perform their basic function—the intelligent and
efficient allocation of capital?
It is all cleverness.
“Too clever by half” is the way my mother would have put it.
If all these things really enhanced liquidity, you wouldn’t get all these
days with lopsided breadth. It is all one-way Street stuff. It may be a
facile way of “putting money to work,” but nothing about it lasts, because
it has no substance. And that lack of meaningful intent behind any
observable actions is making it very difficult for people like you and me to
figure out what the market is saying. All action is superficial, momentary.
Every little move is a peculiarity. Why is Avon down 5 points today? Because
it said one little thing. Why was Wal-Mart just bludgeoned? Because earnings
came in a penny less than expected. A reaction that violent, to something so
transitory, doesn’t make sense in terms of any framework we learned growing
up. There should have been bidders ready to snap up WMT as an opportunity on
the buy side, long before it dropped that far. But now there’s nobody
willing to take the other side of a transaction. You couldn’t have these
extremes in breadth statistics if there were. In the old days, I can
remember when Bob Farrell would call 2-to1 breadth a big day! Now, that
doesn’t strike anyone as lopsided.
You’re complaining there’s a lot more noise—meaningless information—in the
market today?
The noise level in the market has been raised tremendously, exponentially.
More than ever, if you are managing money, you have to do your own research;
your own thinking. You have to put blinders on, to avoid being distracted by
lots of activity with no substance.
Research is precisely what you just told me your clients don’t have time to
do—
That’s where you and I come in! And it may be that my complaints will
largely resolve themselves, as the aftermath of the bubble recedes. I am
inclined to think that we are not done yet with the downside. If that is the
case, then much of this superficiality and illusory liquidity are just
standard components of a typical intervening rally. It will only be clear in
retrospect, but we might be experiencing something akin to the intervening
rally in 1971-1972. I actually lived through that one, which took the market
up to the Nifty-Fifty highs before the bear market resumed with vengeance in
1973-1974. The subsequent decline was, in simple terms, a final wave down.
Elliott had a fancier way to describe it, I’ve lost track of those terms,
but that’s what it was. But the rally that preceded it was something to
behold: Lasted 18 months, went almost back up the high in the Dow. Yet it
had no substance, either.
None?
Let me get the timing right. The bottom was in the middle of 1970. That was
followed by six months of a good rally into April of 1971. Then Nixon
announced some game plan on a Sunday night that capped the rally.

©The New Yorker Collection 1998 Mick Stevens from
cartoonbank.com. All rights reserved.
Probably a plan to withdraw a few troops from Vietnam, or begin ping pong
diplomacy.
Whatever. What I do remember is that I started the Professional Tape Reader
at the end of 1971 and quickly found, by early 1972, that there was nothing
to write about. The market had been drifting down since that April and
absolutely nothing was happening. In desperation, I went down to the
exchange floor, and started standing around the specialists’ posts to pick
up chatter. It was the sense of communicating that sense of being on the
floor that made my letter a success. Which was lucky, because I didn’t have
much else co communicate; no stocks to recommend.
Then along came the Nifty-Fifty and the market exploded—for 8 weeks—and
peaked. Then came 1973 and 1974.
Which are definitely not recalled fondly around the Street. Are you
predicting a replay in 2004?
Not really, comparisons like that are really too facile. The markets were
very simple then. That’s the problem with looking at historical experience.
The lessons we can learn from the Nifty-Fifty era or even from the 1929
Crash are quite limited. We’ve never had, in modern times, a bubble anything
like the late 1990s. There’s nothing of the same magnitude to compare it
with, except Japan’s bubble in the 1980s. And you know as well as I that a
host of cultural differences probably mean Japan’s bubble wasn’t very
comparable, either.
That’s arguable, to say the least. And we did have an enormous commodities
bubble here, in the late 1970s.
Yes, but there is no question in my mind that this is a much more complex
global financial phenomenon than any of those.
There’s always a wall of worry, like the disappearing dollar and bottomless
oceans of consumer debt, to worry about—
Certainly, but there’s an interconnectedness today and lots more layers of
complexity. My sense is that it is just too soon for the aftermath of the
bubble to be exorcised from the market. It is going to take time for it to
work its way through. And if so, the Bush Administration likely gets
re-elected—only to find itself in a very Herbert Hoover-like position.
Yikes, Wall Street isn’t discounting that
So I can see a final leg coming in ’05 and ’06 that could be awful. Even
dangerous to our well-being. Meanwhile, the China story is just as obvious
as can be. Sure, it will have its ups and downs, its really big selloffs, as
it gets going. But there is substance to what is happening in China. Its
long-term prospects have got to be very powerful. It is just too big. Still,
I cringe every time they talk about it on CNBC.
And fan the speculation. The sleeping giant may really be awakening, Justin,
but the question is whether any Western capitalists will be allowed to make
a nickel on it.
Well, they are very shrewd and their merchants are all over Asia, so they
know what they need. And they have infinite patience, which none of the rest
of us have. This is 100-year kind of thing. When I talk about Chinese stocks
in conference rooms, I say, “These are things you buy for your
grandchildren,” and then they listen. That matters to them. If you say,
“Here is a stock you should buy right now,” they say, “Oh well, it has
already tripled; I don’t want to buy it now.” Anyway, when I play with this
China thing in my head a little bit, I start to see that what is missing now
in this market, its drained-off substance, has gone to a different, younger,
more vibrant place. No wonder we complain that we’re only doing dribs and
drabs of the things we did in our youths. Our markets really aren’t like
they used to be.
You must really have had a melancholy start to the New Year!
Not really. Despite my complaining, I know it takes just as long now for a
top to form as it ever did. I know that stocks breaking a trendline is only
a short-term signal. I know it’s not until that is visible on the weekly
charts that it’s meaningful. Likewise, I know that for all of the yearend
ugliness in Intel (INTC)and Texas Instruments (TXN) and KLA-Tencor Corp. (KLAC),
they are not ready to go down in any meaningful way—because you can’t see
that terrible stuff on the weekly charts yet. It is just too soon. They are
deteriorating, but that word is wonderfully Fed-like: imprecise in terms of
time. This bit-by-bit deterioration can go on for months, so can this lack
of substance; this lack of any underlying long-term investment thesis to
believe in. The only way out of it—it is like a football team. You don’t
come out of a 1-and-15 season ready to win the Super Bowl next season.
Bad news, Giant fans!
Everything has to change. They have to get rid of the bad players. In the
stock market, you need some kind of enema.
An elegant image, that.
It’s accurate. There has to be a cleanout, like the ones before the major
turns, in the U.S. in 1932 and in Japan, in 1974, before you can start over
again. That is what this deterioration is all about. The enema is still to
come—but I can clearly see that it is not around the corner yet. Then
there’s the election, which probably pushes it off. But no matter which
party wins, the enema almost certainly comes after the election—
Why not sooner? You’ve got an awful lot of company in the
everything-is-okay-til-after-the-election-camp.
True, but the public is extremely confident and it’ll take time for that to
dissipate. The Fed has to tighten after its “considerable” time, whatever
that means. And I expect the public will absorb that, at first, with
surprising equanimity. So it will probably take a year for stocks to
deteriorate overtly enough for people to start to recognize how bearish this
is. Maybe longer. The market is often halfway down before most investors
wake up. And the Fed isn’t any more alert. By the time it starts to tighten,
the market will have already tightened. The Fed is always late.
So you see the market just drifting, until then?
There really are almost no public investors left out there. Only some
residual speculators who cling to the idea they’ll do it right the next
time. Some of whom even were reasonably successful in low-priced tech stocks
last year, but they are now losing money in the Chinese techs, the SOHUs and
the SINAs that were hot six months ago but now are not. Because they don’t
own the Chinese prosaics that have gone up instead. They are tech
speculators; people who came into the market in the bubble days and in one
way or another became addicted to the market. It is their opium.
Tech junkies. Another wonderful image.
Also a dying breed. Which makes it all the more interesting when wife, who
is a retail broker at Merrill Lynch, comes home with a big brochure her firm
has just put together on ETFs. All of a sudden, ETFs have hit the
mainstream. After all, who wants to talk about mutual funds now? Clearly,
over the next 2, 3, 4, 5 years, however long it takes, there is going to be
an enormous change in the way brokers do business.
The brokers have to love it. Every ETF purchase or sale is a
commission-generating trade.
Even better, they—or their customers—don’t have to pick stocks. That is what
works. Someone can speculate in the homebuilders or in the biotechs, without
having to know anything about the stocks, even their names. This change is
well underway in the institutional world. Now, ETFs are being marketed
heavily to individual investors. And reported trading statistics will become
even more deceptive.
In what sense?
Deceptive because so much volume is involved in—“program trading” is such an
abused term, means so many different things—but an enormous proportion of
today’s trades involve index arbitrage in one way or another. An awful lot
of buying and selling activity is “ganged” and executed mechanically,
automatically.
And the resulting exposures hedged away, supposedly, in the blink of an eye.
All the upstairs desks are arbitraging this stuff constantly, because they
can do it for pennies or less. Or just for something to do, to look busy.
But they never hold a position overnight.
Your complaint, then, is that there’s too much volume and too little
investment?
That is fair to say. It sounds a little glib and superficial. But it’s fair
to say that very little Wall Street activity now has to do with investing. I
could name only a handful of people who still are truly investing with
three-to-five-year horizons. My favorite manager has been sticking with
Oregon Steel Mills (OR), up and down from 2 to 4 to 2 to 4 to 2 to 4. Now,
at 6, he is right. But he has a capacity to endure, which is not
run-of-the-mill anymore. The notion of investing is not what it used to be.
The whole society is hooked on instant gratification, why should portfolio
managers be any different?
Good question. But I think it’s more than that. The bubble changed the
investment landscape in many ways, but one of the most significant is that
an awful lot of experienced value managers retired. The portfolios they used
to manage are now being run by a new generation, more specifically, by
people who aren’t at all used to acting like what you or I would call
investors. Long-term is not their style. They weren’t brought up in markets
that rewarded patience or research. That’s not what they expect to see.
No, it’s all about momentum and short-term trading, in their book.
Right. Gains and losses, they understand. Being able to watch the market in
the way everybody now watches it has only exacerbated this. You can’t watch
CNBC all day, while at your computer able to access all sorts of
information, without “investing” moment to moment. Because the information
you are feeding your mind is moment-to-moment. Maybe we shouldn’t call it a
problem. Maybe they are entitled to be this way. Who are we to be so
prejudiced that “investing” is the right approach? We are not being
open-minded.
I’d stay on the side of “closed minds” like Ben Graham and Warren Buffett,
thanks! But clearly, the market has been commoditized by all the program
trading and is being reduced to a casino by this relentless focus on the
short-term, instant gratification.
The mentality has changed. The attitude now is that the stock market is Las
Vegas, perhaps a classier Vegas, perhaps not. The bet is, “I’ll buy and hope
it goes up.” And the shorter-term you are, the greater the sense of control
you have. That goes for the professionals, too. Most of them learned one
thing in bear market: not to hold onto positions. Now, they have a lot of
lost ground to make up, and are determined to take profits whenever they
have them. Another reason the climate has become anti long-term,
anti-investor. I see it all the time in the questions portfolio managers
ask.
Such as?
I’ve had a lot of questions in the last week or so about the homebuilders.
The stocks are rolling over and topping out. But it is still a little early
to act in most of the issues, so I’ve been careful in my answers. Probably
turned off clients with long-winded explanations about the specifics in
various charts. Their instant reactions have been, “Well, why can’t I just
short the ETF?” So I’ve given them some parameters. I’ll draw a couple of
lines and fax pictures to them. That’s where their heads are. Everything has
to be quick and dirty now; all the trading bunched into ETFs and programs,
for pennies. It creates the illusion that breadth is overwhelmingly
positive, but there’s no investment substance to the volume. Then, if you
step back and look at the stocks that have not been participating on the
upside since, let’s say, the first of December—or actually going down, like
Applied Materials (which recently made a second lower high, below its peak
of last June), you find there are dozens and dozens of stocks in that
category. Despite the supposedly strong breadth and new highs in the
indices.
Telling you, what?
Well, I know when I felt this way before: In ’87 and in ’99, when I got
enormously frustrated, seeing all kinds of indications things were not good,
yet watching the market go up and up. It got to the point that I walked
around the house muttering. As my wife points out to me, I get that way when
a big trend is about to change. There is this enormous confidence out there
now in the market. But everyone is grabbing piddling profits and running.
There’s no follow-through.
No kidding. No one wants to hold a position overnight.
They sell them at the end of the day. But what is the risk? A terrorist
attack? The Fed is not going to act overnight. There is not going to be some
kind of terrible economic number overnight. The risk in this game is that
someone will take their 3 or 4 cents away from them. So there’s also no
volatility.
Just a couple years ago, everyone was complaining that there was too much
volatility.
That was in the early stages of the bear market. Everyone was frantic to
figure out how to deal with the bursting of the bubble, how to get out of
stocks and how to make some money. The swings were huge. Now we largely see
very tiny, and sideways, moves. Look at Anheuser-Busch (BUD). The stock has
hardly budged. Nobody cares. If someone recommends a stock, it will go up a
point for the first hour and then trading will dry up. Don’t get me wrong.
This is not boring. But it is challenging. At least there are a few groups
where something is going on, like the homebuilders, gold and the semis, to
keep people calling me. But in the vast majority of stocks, there’s just no
interest. I bet if I walked into almost any trading room and asked, “What
does General Mills look like today?” no one would answer. Half of them
wouldn’t even know what symbol (GIS) to punch into their machines to find
out.
Are you suggesting that this is a calm before a storm?
Your question suggests to me that you’re relying on some gut level
experience that says the complacency and the confidence have gone too far,
so they are about to be punished. I’d rather rely on the charts. What I see
there, if I can put on blinders and just look at the charts, doesn’t fill me
with that sort of foreboding. I have always believed in the weak stocks
getting weaker and the strong stocks getting stronger. So I am worried now
about the weakness in certain areas and I am not going to worry about
Caterpillar (CAT) or Inco (N). Those stocks haven’t had a correction, so
when they do have a first correction, it will properly be called
profit-taking and they will find buyers. They are not long-term vulnerable.
But when you look, by contrast, at an Intel or Applied Materials or Adobe (ADBE)
or Dell (DELL)—these stocks have not been acting well now for 6 weeks. They
probably will violate some important uptrend lines that go back, not just to
last October, but to last March, in the next correction. So that is where I
can see some vulnerability.
What about the housing stocks?
What I see in the homebuilders’ charts is that the group is somewhere in
between those two extremes. The homebuilders have to make very large tops
because they have had such a big move. This takes me back to the teachings
of John Magee, who kept no indicators, no breadth numbers, no sentiment
numbers. Just his charts. What he would do here is look at his charts and
say something like, “The charts themselves are saying to me that I have an
increasing number of rolling over, failing stocks.” His basic philosophy was
that weak stocks get weaker—and those are the ones that haven’t rallied
here, even as the Nasdaq has made new highs. The ones that have made second
and third successive lower highs, I don’t want to own anymore. But do I want
to short them? That depends on how bad is the market going to be. How
widespread the correction is.
What’s your bet?
I think we have to have a correction in the broad averages somewhere in here
soon.
Just because trees don’t grow to the sky?
That is pretty much it. Granted, it’s the conventional view. But sooner or
later, the coin is going to come up heads. The breadth oscillators, as I’ve
said, would normally give us a warning, but they have been very unreliable
in this market, except over the very short-term. So about all I can say with
confidence here is that we should have a short-term correction, and that we
are overdue for something on the order of, not just 3-5%, but 10-15%. And in
that case, the techs look like they’d be the weakest stocks, probably
followed by many of the retailers: May Department Stores, (May) Federated
(FD); you can see Target (TGT) and Kohls (KSS) weakening already. Wal-Mart
would probably top the list. Of course, in a broad correction, my cyclicals
would also be vulnerable to profit-taking, but that would be their first
correction, and it’s unlikely that they’ll violate any support levels. Their
long-term moving average lines will still be going up. It is stocks that
have been doing well that you’d want to buy in a correction, and there are
just two groups that spring to mind. The solid electric utilities, like a
Duke Energy (DUK), which has gone from 17 to 21 or something like that,
comprise the first group. If it comes back to 19, you want to buy it. Then
there’s a Merck (MRK), which went from 42 or 43 to 47. If it comes back to
44, you want to buy it.
Nothing else?
Well, the so-called laggards, the stocks that have been moving in some kind
of basing way, are probably going to be okay. If we do get a 10% to 15%
correction, they could look like relative strength stocks. If so, that would
suggest to me that the market has changed. That the cyclicals have probably
peaked. They might have another run or two, but that would mean the
parabolic part of their rise is over. And in that case, I suspect the
market’s interest would shift into “safe” stocks like a Merck, the electric
utilities, probably things like a Heinz (HNZ) or a Kellogg (K). If relative
strength still means anything, those will be the safe havens and the bond
market will probably be in some trouble. After all, the bond market does not
care when the Fed hikes. It knows what the next direction is. So the safe
haven won’t be going into bonds. What we’re going to see will be asset
allocation switches, lots of very short-term stuff. Which should tend to
make this year into what I’ve called a transitional market. So don’t count
on any trend lasting too long. I firmly believe that we haven’t had the
final leg-down yet in the post-bubble bear market. So there is something out
there that could really send this market into a one-more-leg-down, serious
bear market. One that isn’t over, overnight. What I am most reminded of is
1974. Like then, there won’t be just one tightening. Which is going to
depress the market immensely over a long time. It will probably have
implications for the dollar and for gold, too. And you can’t have the kind
of market transition, with failures in the techs leading the way, without
having a more serious and culminating bear market.
Lasting how long?
Well, if the transitional market lasts through the election—I am presuming
that the Republicans win and that the transitional market of 2004 will
likely feature a bout of optimism, as well as the correction I see in the
not-too-distant future, what I expect to unfold after the election is the
culminating leg of the bear market. Something that is very long term.
Meanwhile, this is going to be one of those treacherous years when portfolio
managers will have to be in the right places—and avoid the wrong places. I
am not sure what the right places will be, but I would rather own three
simple-minded stocks like Heinz, Bristol Myers and Duke Power than I would
any tech or any retailer or any financial—especially anything to do with
mortgages and home building. Or the stuff that has been very bubbly, like
the Chinese stocks, especially the techs whose charts are now failing.
You sounded pretty high on China earlier.
Very long term. But before they can really come on again, the analogy I
would make is that they have to have their 1929. There has been so much
speculation in the stocks, I wouldn’t be surprised to see it. Just look at
the China Fund. It is trading 65% above its net asset value—even though the
Shanghai market is scarcely up at all. All the Chinese people are betting
here on their stocks. They are not buying locally. The movement is global.
Just like the interest in commodities funds.
Care to single out any vulnerable Chinese stocks?
Well, Sohu.com (SOHU) and Sina Corp. (SINA) are the really obvious ones. And
Netease.com (NTES). Also looking weak: China.com (CHINA), China Yuchai (CYD),
Bonso Electronics (BNSO), and even Aluminum Corp. of China (ACH). By
contrast, there were 8 or 10 Chinese stocks that exploded last Friday on the
upside, all prosaics. But even those look extended and vulnerable. There has
been a real mini-bubble in these Chinese issues—and this sort of action just
has to be warning us that we’re coming to an emotional peak in here. Plus,
profit-taking is going on just like it was in early 2000. Nobody wanted to
recognize it then, either.
Just like the insider trading.
That’s right. But portfolio managers keep telling me things like they can’t
afford to miss a move. That is the feeling you have when you get into this
kind of gambling. You really, truly don’t want to leave money on the table.
You get too greedy. I can remember people taking that way in February and
March of 2000.
Enough said. Thanks, Justin.
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Illustration: Charles Powell |